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Abstract—In this paper an incentive model to improve the col-
laboration in peer-to-peer networks is introduced. The pro-
posed solution uses an incentives model associated with rep-
utation issues as a way to improve the performance of a P2P
system. The reputation of the all peers in the system is based
on their donated resources and on their behavior. Supplying
peers use these rules as a way to assign its outgoing band-
width to the requesting peers during a content distribution.
Each peer can build its best paths by using a best-neighbor
policy within its neighborhood. A peer can use its best paths
to obtain best services related to content search or download.
The obtained results show that proposed scheme insulates the
misbehaving peers and reduces the free-riding so that the sys-
tems performance is maximized.
Keywords—content distribution, incentive model, reputation,
peer-to-peer networks.
1. Introduction
During the last years, content delivery over the Internet
has gained significant popularity. Applications such as TV
over IP, streaming and multimedia live streaming are ex-
amples of content distribution from one-source to multiple
receiver-nodes. On the other hand, peer-to-peer (P2P) net-
works have attracted the attention from the research com-
munity who find in these systems a fast and efficient way to
deliver movies, music or software files. A P2P communica-
tion infrastructure is formed by a group of nodes located in
a physical network. These nodes build a network abstrac-
tion on top of the physical network, known as an overlay
network, which is independent of the underlying physical
network with regard to the P2P procedures. An important
advantage of P2P systems is that all available resources are
provided by the peers. In a P2P system each peer can take
the role of both, a server and of a client at the same time.
During content distribution, peers contribute their resources
to relay the content to others. Thus, as a new peer arrives
to the P2P system the demand is increased, but the overall
capacity too. This is not possible in a client-server model
with a fixed number of servers.
A challenge in peer-to-peer media streaming systems is
how to select good peers in order to realize high quality
streaming sessions. The selection of good peers can offer
a manner to improve the quality of service via an optimal
search or an efficient content delivery. However, this goal
is difficult to be achieved because P2P systems can be af-
fected by misbehaving peers and free-riding, which reduce
the system performance. Reputation management systems
have been proposed as promise methods to alleviate this
problem [1]–[3]. A reputation management system allows
individual peers to rate one to each other according to their
past experience with each other. Reputation systems are
proposed in [1], [4]–[6] with the purpose to ensure that
peers obtain reliable information about the quality of the
resources they are receiving.
On the other hand, locate a provider node does not guar-
antee that the service provided by it will satisfy user de-
mands [7]. This is because some misbehaving peers may
offer false information in order to maintain a cooperation
impression. To minimize the effects of misbehaving peers,
they must be detected and isolated from the system. In
this paper an incentives model associated with a reputa-
tion scheme to reduce the negative impact of these peers in
a P2P system is proposed. In a reputation management sys-
tem, each peer can realize an optimal peer selection from
which download a specific content. The goal in this work is
to examine how incentives and reputation affect the perfor-
mance of a P2P network. To reach this goal, both charac-
teristics in order to obtain the following benefits is mixed.
First, peers with high reputation can cooperate to realize
an optimal search or a better content delivery. Second,
an incentives-system can encourage the collaboration and
exchange of data between peers [8], [9]. Finally, the iso-
lation of misbehaving or non-cooperative peers can avoid
the degradation of the system performance. In this way,
the number of corrupted file downloads from malicious
peers on the P2P network could be minimized, the number
of cooperative peers increased and the number of success
downloads improved. The author motivation to implement
incentives and reputation issues on a P2P network are the
following:
– selection of good peers could improve the content
delivery services,
– simulate a P2P system that allows a fair distribution
of the available resources in the networks,
– provide different access polices to the system re-
sources,
– increase level of cooperation to provide high quality
streaming to users in a large system,
– empirical validation of the effectiveness of our ap-
proach in a P2P network.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives a background about this work. The incentive and
reputation schemes are introduced in Section 3. Then,
the evaluation of proposed system and its results are de-
scribed and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Background
2.1. Media Content Delivery
Today, we witness an exponential rise in the number of
Internet users. Many of these users generate contents that
are accessed by other users interested in them. Multimedia
contents has already become the most popular content to be
distributed over Internet. This is due to the fact that mul-
timedia contents are currently generated by a high number
of applications such as videoconferencing, media broad-
casting, e-learning, video streaming, etc.
Media can be transmitted in two different modes: down-
load an streaming. In the download mode, the users have to
download the entire media file before playing it. However,
the media files generally are very large which require long
transfer times and large storage capacities. The download
mode requires patience from the users, who have to wait
until the entire video has been downloaded before it can be
viewed. Download also offers reduced flexibility, because
the users must download the entire video before deciding if
it is the wanted one [10]. In contrast, in the media stream-
ing mode, the receiver can already consume the media file
while part of it is being received and decoded. In others
words, media streaming reduces the delay between the start
of delivery and the beginning of playback at the viewer, and
its requirements of storage are low, because only a small
portion of the video needs to be stored by the viewer during
media streaming. However, video streaming is sensitive to
the delay [11], because the packets must arrive at the re-
ceiver before their play-out deadlines.
Media delivery can be realized using different communi-
cation techniques such as as: unicast, broadcast and multi-
cast. Unicast represents a common communication form be-
tween two entities. Unicast communication also is known as
point-to-point or one-to-one communication. Unicast com-
munication can be simplex, half-duplex or duplex. Tele-
phone conversations and video streaming over the Inter-
net [12] are typical unicast examples. Broadcast means
that the information emitted from a source will be re-
ceived by all the other devices connected at the same
network. Broadcast probably represents the most popular
communication scheme due to its wide usage in broadcast
television. Multicast is similar to broadcast except that
the information emitted from a source is only received
by a specific group of nodes in the network, which is
called a multicast group. Multicast is an alternative to
unicast that reduces the network traffic and optimizes the
server resources. Multicast is a one-to-many communica-
tion scheme, while broadcast is an one-to-all communi-
cation. Videoconferencing is a multicast example, where
a predefined group of devices/computers are involved to
receive the same content.
2.2. P2P Content Delivery Topologies
The two most important types of technological solutions
that have been proposed for content delivery on the Inter-
net are Content-Delivery Networks (CDN) and Peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks. A CDN is formed by content servers net-
worked together across the Internet, which cooperate with
each other to transparently distribute content to end-users.
Typically, the content servers are located near the users, in
order to be able to serve the requested content rapidly [13].
However, the CDN approach faces a number of problems
such as single point of failure and costly access to high
rate networks. In [14] is presented an extensive discus-
sion about CDN. On the other hand, P2P networks has
emerged as a promising infrastructure to the distribution
of large-sized media content to a large population [15].
A P2P communication infrastructure is formed by a group
of nodes located in a physical network. These nodes build
a network abstraction on top of the physical network known
as an overlay network, which is independent of the underly-
ing physical network. The overlay network is established by
each P2P system through TCP or HTTP connections. Due
to the abstraction layer TCP protocol stack, the physical
connections are not reflected by the overlay network [10].
Based on how the nodes in the overlay structure are con-
nected to each other, P2P systems are classified mainly into
two categories: unstructured and structured. Unstructured
P2P systems can be further divided in [16]: centralized,
pure and hybrid. Kademlia [17] is an example of pure P2P
systems, while BitTorrent [18] is an example of hybrid P2P
systems. Figure 1 shows this classification.
Fig. 1. A comparison among the different unstructured P2P
architectures: (a) centralized, (b) pure, (c) hybrid.
Content delivery over P2P networks can be realized us-
ing three different schemes: tree-based, forest-based and
mesh-based. These schemes are illustrated in Fig. 2. In
a tree-based system, participating peers are organized in
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a hierarchical way in which source node is located at the
root. The rest of peers are organized as interior nodes or
leaf nodes into a single tree. Leaf nodes don’t need to for-
ward the receive packets [19]. In Fig. 1a, the source S sends
the data to requesting peer R1, which forwards the data to
requesting peers R2 and R3. Then, a packet in this con-
figuration is basically pushed from a parent node to their
children node along a well-defined route. Thus, in Fig. 1a
the upload capacity of peer R1 is used by the multicast
tree for content distribution, while the upload capacity of
the leaf peers R2 and R3 is not used. Main drawback in
a tree-based scheme is because all the burden generated by
forwarding multicast messages is carried out by a relative
small number of interior nodes.
Cooperation plays an important role in the P2P systems.
However, content delivery based on a single tree does not
match well for cooperative environments, because the for-
warding multicast traffic is carried by a small number of
interior peers, while the upload capacities of a large num-
ber of leaf peers is not used. To face these challenges,
a forest-based overlay architecture for content delivery has
been proposed. A forest-based overlay organizes partici-
pating peers into multiple trees [20], and distributes the
forwarding load among them in an efficient manner. An
example of a forest-based system is shown in Fig. 2b. Here,
source S stripes its content and distributes the stripes using
two separate trees T1 and T2. Each internal node in each
distribution tree forwards any received stripe to all of their
child nodes. However, the determination of the number of
required trees to maximize the overall throughput of the
system is a hard task.
Fig. 2. P2P streaming delivery schemes: (a) tree-based overlay,
(b) forest-based overlay, (c) mesh-based overlay.
Limitations of the forest-based systems have led to the
emergence of a new approach called mesh-based systems.
This type of P2P systems are formed by peers, which are
interconnected via random connections. In this scheme
each peer (except the source) tries to maintain a certain
number of parent peers and also serves a specific number
of child peers using a swarming mechanism for content
delivery [21]. A mesh-based scheme is shown in Fig. 2c.
In a mesh-based P2P topology, a peer can concurrently re-
ceive data from different sources, and send the received
data to other requesting peers. Although mesh-based P2P
systems are less vulnerable to network dynamic [13], they
introduce long latency in media playback mainly due to pe-
riodic exchanges of buffer maps and transmission of data
request.
2.3. Why Do We Need Reputation Management?
P2P networks are liable to be invaded by the malicious peer,
this is due to the fact that any peer can join the network
at any time to share or use any type of file. These ma-
licious peers are computers that share inauthentic files or
give false information about their resources (CPU, memory
available, bandwidth, etc.). Examples of inauthentic files
include corrupted files, virus-infected files or spam [22]. In
order to minimize the effects of malicious peers on a P2P
network, there is a need to isolate these peers from peers
with good behavior who are sharing authentic files, which
are high-quality, virus-free files. In addition, peers should
be informed about the best sources from which download
files. This information needs to have a way to be propagated
through network so that all peers have a wide view of the
reputations of all other peers in the network. In a P2P net-
work with a reputation management system, each peer will
be better able to make good decisions about which other
peers are available to download files, thus minimizing the
number of files downloaded from malicious peers on the
network and increase the number of successful downloads.
2.4. Why Do We Need an Incentives Mechanism?
Most P2P systems are based on cooperation among inter-
ested users [19]. However, cooperation consumes user’s
resources and may degrade their performance, which could
generate disincentives for cooperating in the users. As a re-
sult, each user’s attempt to maximize its own utility effec-
tively lowers the overall performance of the system. To
avoid this scenario, there is a need to introduce incentives
for the cooperation. To maintain satisfied peers in the sys-
tem, the proposed strategy of upload allocation is to make
that each peer’s download rate be proportional to its upload
rate (parity download/upload). The author used the reputa-
tion generosity rings to translate this approach in an incen-
tive way to proposed model. To verify data integrity, there
are many techniques, such as SHA1, which hashes all the
pieces included in the file, and peers don’t report that they
have a piece until they have checked the hash. Selection of
good choking algorithms in order to utilize all available
resources, provide reasonably consistent download rates
for all peers.
3. Related Work
P2P systems based on reputation have been proposed in
several works [1], [2], [4], [5], [7]. In most of these
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Fig. 3. The proposed reputation architecture with participating peers, neighborhood and pool of managers peers.
proposals, each node is associated with a reputation es-
tablished based on the feedbacks from others that it has
made transactions with. The reputation information helps
users to identify and avoid malicious nodes [23]. On the
other hand, independent mechanism or systems associ-
ated with reputation have been proposed in some recent
works [23]–[29]. Authors in [24] show that a rank-based
incentive mechanism achieves cooperation through service
differentiation. In this framework, the contribution of a user
is converted into a score, then the score is mapped into
a rank, and the rank provides flexibility in the peer selec-
tion that determines the quality of a streaming session. The
incentives mechanism reduces the data redundancy required
during a streaming session to tolerate packet loss [24].
Without the incentive mechanism, it is required to send
more redundant data to achieve the same QoS that the
incentive mechanism can provided. In [25] is proposed
a wage-based incentive mechanism for enforcing truthful
report in self-interested P2P networks. Additionally, au-
thors propose a set of incentive compatibility constraint
rules including participation constraints and self-selection
constraints. Incentive schemes have been used in the P2P
systems to reduce free-riders and to encourage cooperative
behavior in [27]. Transactions of a distributed P2P file-
sharing system are modeled in [26], using feedback based
on transaction outcomes and reputation issues, to encour-
age cooperation among peers. In [23] Zhan et al. propose
a distributed incentive scheme called MARCH, which as-
sociates money and reputation parameters to each peer. In
this scheme, peers can increase their reputation level by
exchanging money for service. Since it is a scheme based
on a business model, a central authority is used to settle
disputes between peers when services offered by a peer are
not satisfactory. Based on this rule peers can be classified
as honest, selfish and malicious.
This paper presents an incentive model on P2P networks
that isolates misbehaving peers. The goal is that by isolat-
ing these peers the system performance can be improved.
Having peers with high reputation can cooperate to make
an optimal search or a better content delivery. An incen-
tive scheme can also help in collaboration and exchange
of data between peers. Author evaluates proposed protocol
in two different P2P infrastructures, which are Kademlia
and BiTorrent. Kademlia [17] is a distributed hash table
protocol designed for decentralized P2P networks, while
BitTorrent is a hybrid P2P system based on super-peer.
4. System Overview
To introduce proposed incentives and reputation scheme, an
overlay network is considered, which is formed by collab-
orating peers and free-riding peers. The proposed model
introduces a special peer called manager peer, which man-
ages the reputation of all peers in the system. Manager
peer considers that each peer has reputation information of
its neighbor-peers only. This reputation score is stored in
a local table by each peer. Each peer exchanges its local
table with any others peers located in its neighborhood,
which is formed by 2 hops away. A peers establishes direct
links with peers to be reached in one just hop. Contrary,
indirect links are established if the number of hops between
two peers is two. Figure 3 shows this scenario. The pro-
posed model consists of two parts: reputation scheme and
incentives scheme.
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4.1. Reputation Scheme
Proposed reputation model considers that all peers con-
tribute with their resources to the system. Two compo-
nents to obtain the average reputation-score in each peer
are used, which are its shared resources and its behavior in
the system. Shared resources by a peer is used to define its
reputation based on resources (RBR), while the behavior
reputation is defined by the peer’s behavior. In this work,
the resources to be shared by each participating peer in the
systems are: upload capacity, processing capacity, mem-
ory, storage capacity and number of shared files. Thus,
reputation based on resources (RBR) can be computed as:
RBR = Xi(CPU)+ Xi(HD)+ Xi(BW )+ Xi(SF) , (1)
where: CPU = donated CPU capacity, HD = donated hard





(Xi) = 1 .
The weight Xi for each donated resources are fixed by the
manager peers in the system. Xi can be variable and differ-
ent for each resource.
The behavior reputation is the second component to
be evaluated. This value is based on the peer’s behavior
in a cooperation environment, from a cheating level to
a transient level. The cheating level is assigned when a peer
supplies a wrong content or when its donated resources do
not match to promised resources. The transient level in
a peer is determined by the average time that this peer re-
mains in the system (service-time) and by the average time
that it takes to return to the system after it has left. Users
are satisfied when they received content from peers with
abundant resources and good behavior. In the other hand,
users have a bad experience when the participating peers
offer low bandwidth, high error-rates, limited processing
resources, or frequent disconnections. Each component in
the reputation scheme contributes with its weight in the
final score.
Initially, the reputation score of a peer is based on its do-
nated resources only. After several rounds, if this peer is
still available, stable and it does not cheat, then the be-
havior reputation score is increased in this peer. Otherwise
this score is decreased. Behavior reputation evaluation con-
siders that a transaction realized by any peer can be ei-
ther, performed correctly or not. Chosen behavior reputa-
tion scheme is inspired by a reputation scheme introduced
in [30]. Peers interact using a reputation approach.
A complaint message is evaluated in every peer and in
the manager peer. Using this information, each peer builds
a reputation matrix with information from its neighbor-
hood or from the network. Each peer computes the rep-
utation of another peer by evaluating to its neighbors. In
general, this reputation is usually based on an aggregate of
the feedback ratings issued by the diverse peers [2]. When
a peer interacts with another peer, it may rate the transaction
as satisfactory (+1) or unsatisfactory (–1). A transaction
is satisfactory if the retrieval process requested by a peer
is realized successful. In contrast, a transaction is unsat-
isfactory if the requested file is not authentic, promised
resources are false or the download process is often in-
terrupted. In this case, a peer is cheating and its reputa-
tion score must be penalized. A peer records the reputation
score in the reputation matrix, as a local table, while the
manager peer records the reputation score in a global repu-
tation table. This global table is consulted by a peer when
it wants to know the reputation of peers outside its neigh-
borhood (see Fig. 3). A peer can exchange its local reputa-
tion table within its neighborhood in order to insulate the
cheating peers.
When a new peer joins to the system, this peer has all its
entries as undefined, which are updated as the peer interacts
with each other. Every peer updates the reputation of its
local reputation matrix, while the reputation information
from remote peers are obtained from the manager peers.
To compute the behavior reputation in the P2P system, pro-
posed protocol periodically runs a process in order to up-
date the network. A reputation agent updates the reputation
score and the incentives of every peer based on its behavior
(cheating level and transient level). Initially, the global rep-
utation score is based on resources only, and the behavior
reputation is initialized in 0. The behavior reputation score
of a peer is increased if it maintains a good service or it
does not cheat. On the other way, the behavior reputation
score is decreased.
Each peer has the following statuses: Up, Down and Cheat-
ing. These status define several scenarios for each peer
such as reputation update of a peer, expiration of a round
or beginning the update process. Up status means that peer
does not cheat, then a reputation agent computes the av-
erage number of round that a peer remains connected to
the network and its behavior reputation score. Down status
means that peer is disconnected. If the peer status is Down
and it does not cheat, then, to determine how many rounds
a peer is in this status is needed.
Fig. 4. Cheating peers are isolated by the system.
To calculate the behavior reputation, the author divides the
simulation time in discrete rounds, where the network is
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updated. In this period the reputation values and incen-
tives in each peer are revised and updated according with
its behavior (e.g. connected time, stability, cheating, avail-
ability) and current resources. During the first round, the
reputation score is zero for all peers. However, in the fol-
lowing rounds the reputation score of all peers is based on
shared resources and their behavior. If the status of a peer
is Cheating, then its reputation is decreased to 0 in all its
neighbor peers and in the manager peers. All peers isolate
the cheating peer, and they do not send, forward or receive
any messages or data from it. An example of cheating peers
isolated by the system is shown in Fig. 4.
4.2. Incentive Model
P2P systems are basically based on cooperation among in-
terested users. However, many users of these systems have
natural disincentives to cooperate because cooperation con-
sumes their own resources and degrade their own perfor-
mance [24], [31]. Consequently, each user attempts to max-
imize its own utility effectively lowers the overall utility of
the system. Incentives have been used as a useful solution
to motive the cooperation among peers in a P2P system.
In this work, an approach based on the game theory is
adopted. In particular, a choking algorithms model is used
to capture the essential tension between individual and so-
cial utility, asymmetric payoffmatrices to allow asymmetric
transactions between peers, and a learning-based population
dynamic model to specify the behavior of individual peers.
Peers can continuously change its behavior.
Presented cooperation approach considers upload and
download rates as a generosity factor, and translates the
cooperation concept to earnings if peers cooperating or it
loss if not. Generosity factor measures the benefit that an
entity provides relative to the benefit it consumes. This is
important because entities which consume more services
than they provide, could cause the cooperation collapse.
For some entity i, Pi and Ci are the services provided and
consumed by i, respectively. Therefore, generosity of an
entity i can be represented as:
Generosity(i) = Pi/Ci . (2)
The generosity resumes the General Prisoner’s Dilemma for
an asymmetric payoff matrix [9], [32]. For our scheme, we
define as a provided services unit to a packet transmitted
successful. On the other hand, a consumed services unit is
defined as a packet received successful. The range of the
generosity factor comprises –1 to +1. The minimum value
(–1) indicates a not cooperate behavior in which peer only
receives packets and does not transmit any. The maximum
value (+1) indicates an overall cooperate behavior in which
a peer only transmits packets and does not receive any.
Each node builds a hierarchical structure of rings using
its reputation table and the generosity factor. These rep-
utation/generosity rings are used by a supplying peer to
organize to the requesting peers, which wish to download
any content from it. Each peer encloses each requesting
Fig. 5. Example of a distribution scenario with three reputation
rings.
peer in rings following a hierarchical organization. Thus,
peers with highest reputation and generosity are allocated
in the higher rings close to the source. This means that
these peers receive more incentives than peers allocated in
lowest rings. Figure 5 shows this scenario. In this case,
eight requesting peers are distributed through three rings.
The number of reputation rings and its reputation thresh-
olds are values can be fixed by manager peers. In this work,
if a requesting peer receives more incentives means that it
receives more bandwidth to download contents. These rep-
utation/generosity rings are used to implement proposed
content distribution scheme. The incentives percentages
can be fixed by each peer.
4.3. Operation Protocol
Presented protocol defines a set of communication mes-
sages to exchange data between peers. A set of rules are
used to govern these communication messages. When new
peer joins to a P2P network, it must contact with a man-
ager peer and its neighbors. First, a new peer discovers
its neighbors and builds its local table with its neighbors.
Second, each new peer must deliver information about its
local table to the manager peer. Third, the manager peer
compares its global table with the local table received from
the new peer in order to update the behavior of the peers
in that neighborhood. Thereby, each peer has information
about resources and reputation of its near neighbors (two
hops). This information is stored and updated in a local
table and in the general table of each manager peer. Once
a peer is joined, it selects its first and second best neighbor-
ing peers, and calculate its best neighbor paths. The best
neighbor paths are the best paths obtained from an average
reputation of the neighbors (see Fig. 6), which have a di-
rect connection between each other. Each peer arranges
and stores these paths, which are used during the search
stage.
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Fig. 6. Example of a content distribution scheme based on the best path strategy: (a) file search, (b) file download.
Content distribution scheme is constituted by two stages:
file search and file download. In file search stage, a peer
begins a file request by sending a “query” via its best neigh-
bor. This query is forwarded by the neighbors to their best
neighbor paths, and the responses are collected. Each peer
also forwards to their best neighbor paths the queries real-
ized by its neighbors until the requested file is found. For
the file download stage, first, source peer checks all rep-
utation scores of the requesting peer. Second, requesting
peers are organized in rings. Following the incentives rules,
source peer divides its resources between these requesting
peers. If requesting peer is authorized to download a file
from the source, then this file is downloaded via the best
path. This scenario is shown in Fig. 6. In this case, best
path has a reputation score of 3.5, while alternative path
has a reputation score of 2.25. When content download is
completed, requesting peers are removed from the reputa-
tion/generosity ring by the source peer.
5. Evaluation
In this section, the performance of proposed solution is
evaluated. To this end, proposed model has been simulated
in the Peersim simulator [33]. The author has used this
network simulator because it supports dynamism and scal-
ability. Peersim is written in Java language and it can be
used to simulate small and large-scale P2P systems. This
simulation tool also allows to measure the communication
time between nodes. Peersim is composed of two simu-
lation engines: the cycle-based model and a more tradi-
tional event-based model. The simulation uses the BitTor-
rent and Kademlia prototype [34] developed by the Trento
University for the Peersim simulator. Communication
protocols in both prototypes are developed using Java as
programming language. Information about the resources
donated by each peer such as CPU, bandwidth, memory
and storage capacity is recorded for each peer in its lo-
cal table. The initial reputation is based on resources only.
Initially, there are not any relationship among peers in the
system.
A BitTorrent network is formed by several actors and
components such as peers, leechers, seeders, trackers and
swarm. All users connected to the BitTorrent network are
called peers. In this context there are two types of peers:
seeders and leechers [35]. Seeders are users who have a file,
while leechers are users that only download files. Kadem-
lia is a distributed hash table protocol designed for decen-
tralized P2P networks. Kademlia is deployed as a virtual
network on an existing LAN/WAN network or Internet and
its topology is based on the XOR metric. This metric is use
to calculate distance between points in the key space [17].
Kademlia protocol consists of the following RPCs: Ping,
Store, Find Node, and Find Value. These procedures allow
to specify the network structure, regulates communication
between nodes and exchange of information. The nodes
communicate is realized via the UDP protocol. Reputa-
tion levels in BitTorent are based on shared pieces, while
in Kademlia reputation levels are measured during a direct
download from a node.
To simulate presented protocol on Kademlia and BitTorrent
300 nodes (peers) are used and the same file is downloaded
from the source node. The author evaluates BitTorrent and
Kademlia, without reputation and with reputation levels.
The first experiment evaluates both P2P networks without
reputation levels in the nodes. In this experiments, 15%
of nodes are initialized as seeders nodes while 85% are
leechers nodes. The size of the file to be download is
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100 MB. Initial reputation is random. If node’s reputation
rate is 0, then it removed from the system. Results from
first experiment are shown in Figs. 7 and 8. The number
of leecher nodes that are downloading the same file from
Kademlia network such as from BitTorrent is compared in
Fig. 7. It shows how BitTorrent maintains a smaller number
of leecher nodes compared to Kademlia. Figure 8 shows
the number of seeder nodes from which some parts or full
file can be download, and how in BitTorrent the number of
seeder nodes is increased as time goes. Thus, BitTorrent
has more available seeder nodes from which download the
test file than Kademlia. This facts allows that BitTorrent
presents a best performance to search and download a file
compared to Kademlia.
Fig. 7. Comparison of number of leecher nodes in both P2P
infrastructures without reputation.
Fig. 8. Comparison of number of seeder nodes in both P2P
infrastructures without reputation.
The second experiment evaluates both P2P infrastruc-
tures using reputation levels. As in previous experiment,
300 nodes and a file of 100 MB is considered. Initially,
also 15% of nodes are seeder nodes and 85% are leercher
nodes. Figures 9 and 10 show the results obtained from
our second experiment. Figure 9 shows that BitTorrent
still maintains a smaller number of leecher nodes than
Kademlia. However, leecher nodes are dramatically re-
duced in the Kademlia network as time goes. Figure 10
compares the number of seeders nodes in both P2P net-
works with reputation. Initially, BitTorrent has more seeder
nodes than Kademlia, but as time goes the number of seeder
nodes in both P2P infrastructures is similar. Therefore repu-
tation levels in Kademlia have served to reduce the number
of leechers nodes and to increases the number of seeder
nodes.
Fig. 9. Comparison of number of leecher nodes in both P2P
infrastructures with reputation.
Fig. 10. Comparison of number of seeder nodes in both P2P
infrastructures with reputation.
In a reputation system, good peers cannot send queries to
the misbehaving peers or receive request from them, be-
cause they are isolated. Also, a system without reputation
allows download content from the misbehaving peers in-
creasing the probability of having a greater number of cor-
rupted files. Contrary, cooperation between peers and rep-
utation help to reject corrupt files in the systems. However,
in the real electronic communities correcting the malicious
peer’s behavior is a hard task. Instead of correcting each
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such malicious peer, the author need to minimize its impact
in the system performance.
6. Conclusions
In this work, a reputation scheme based on incentives for
a P2P system was proposed and evaluated. Most of the
reputation systems consider correction of malicious peers
by giving incentives for positive feedbacks. However, in
our proposed model isolates misbehaving peers from good
peers, and incentives are used to motivate most coopera-
tion among peers in the system. The model was evaluated
for two different P2P infrastructures which are Superpeer
(hybrid) and distributed. BitTorrent is used to simulate the
super-peer infrastructure, while the Kademlia protocol is
used to simulate the distributed infrastructure. The experi-
ments show how reputation reduces the number of leechers
peers and increases the number of seeder peers in both in-
frastructures. Although, Kademlia is the P2P infrastructure
most benefited by incorporating reputation levels at nodes,
BitTorrent still presents a little best overall performance,
which is reflected by downloading the file most faster than
Kademlia. An incentives scheme based on reputation can
also reduce free riding, because the non-cooperating peers
are isolated from the system. This fact has benefits both in
faster downloading of files as non-receipt of corrupt files.
Therefore, the reception of corrupted files from the mis-
behaving peers can be reduced or eliminated. Each peer
uses its reputation rings and reputation score in order to
distribute its upload capacity among good peers. As future
work, the author plans to extend proposed scheme to social
networks based on P2P infrastructure. Another possible
extension for this work could be addressed to the large P2P
streaming systems, and to P2P cloud systems.
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